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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN NEW YORK ARBITRATION:
WHO IS REALLY
BEING PUNISHED?
Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Promotion of settlement to reduce litigation is a well-established policy goal
in our federal court system.2 However, when parties cannot resolve all of their
disputes in alternative dispute resolution, this policy goal is undermined. In
arbitration governed by the law of the state of New York, parties are generally
unable to resolve all of their disputes in arbitration when punitive damages would
be warranted. In most cases, the parties' dispute cannot be fully resolved where
punitive damages would be available because an arbiter is not free to award
punitive damages in arbitration under New York law. This is particularly
troublesome because the law of the state of New York is often chosen to govern
agreements in a number of industries. For example, New York law is routinely
incorporated into investment agreements because New York is the world's nerve
center for that industry. This Casenote will explore the ramifications of the New
York approach to punitive damages in arbitration and will propose an approach
which may be more in-line with the policy goals of our judicial system.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case is an appeal from a judgment entered by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, which confirmed an arbitral award
of compensatory and punitive damages based on the defendants' unauthorized
investment of plaintiffs' assets.' On January 7, 1986, the Barbiers entered into
a written agreement with Shearson and opened an investment account." Pursuant
to the parties' agreement, Shearson's broker, Bendelac, would trade securities for
t 'he Barbiers after receiving the Barbiers' authorization of each trade.' On
October 18, 1988, having learned that Bendelac entered trades which were not
1. 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
2. Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); United States v. McInnes, 556 F.2d
436, 441 (9th Cir. 1977); see also FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note.
3. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 118.
4. Id. at 119.
5. Id.
1
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authorized by them and that their investment was thereby diminished, the Barbiers
filed a Statement of Claim with the Arbitration Tribunal of the New York Stock
Exchange. The Barbiers pursued claims for conversion, breach of contract, and
negligence and/or recklessness.'
Pursuant to the parties' contract, which contained an arbitration agreement,
8
the Barbiers' claims were submitted to arbitration, where a unanimous arbitration
panel awarded the Barbiers $130,645 compensatory damages and $25,000 punitive
damages.' The Panel apportioned $31,129 of the award to Shearson and
$124,516 to Bendelac.10
On June 12, 1990, the Barbiers filed a petition for confirmation of the
arbitration award in district court. 1 Each defendant filed separate motions to
vacate the award, stating that, inter alia, the arbitration panel exceeded its
authority in awarding punitive damages.12 On December 3, 1990, the district
court approved, the arbitration award in its entirety and denied the defendants'
motions to vacate. 3 Defendant Bendelac appealed the decision to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, stating that the district court erred in
awarding the plaintiffs punitive damages.' 4 Bendelac asserted that the district
court erred in awarding punitive damages because New York law does not allow
arbiters to award punitives. 5 Bendelac supported this contention by stating that
because jurisdiction was based on diversity, the Erie doctrine required the
application of New York law. 16 Further, Bendelac directed the court's attention
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Paragraph 13 of the parties' agreement contained an arbitration clause which stated that:
This agreement shall be . . . governed by the laws of the state of New York. Unless
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to
[the Barbiers' l accounts, to transactions with [Shearson, its] officers, directors, agents
and/or employees for [the Barbiers] or; to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of Directors of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. as [the Barbiers] may elect .... Judgment upon any award rendered by







14. Id. at 120. Defendant Bendelac also appealed the compensatory damage award. Id. The
court of appeals found no merit in this contention, stating that the district court's holding was not
clearly erroneous. Id. at 121. The court's analysis of Bendelac's contentions involving the
compensatory damages portion of the award does not provide any significant change in the law. Thus,
compensatory damages will not be addressed in this Casenote in order to focus upon the appellate
court's treatment of punitive damages.
15. Id. at 121.
16. Id.
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to New York case law and the holding in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 7 which
stated that an arbiter may not award punitive damages. "
The Barbiers contended that the arbitration award, including the amount
awarded for punitive damages, should be upheld. 9 The Barbiers asserted that
application of the Garrity rule conflicted with federal substantive law and was
thereby "preempted" by the Federal Arbitration Act'0 and, thus, could not be
applied in the determination of this case.2'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the judgment
relating to compensatory damages and reversed that part of the decision which
granted the plaintiffs punitive damages.22 The court directed the district court
to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of $104,516 plus interest.2 3
The court held that punitive damages may not be awarded in arbitration where
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and when the parties have agreed
that New York State law governs their dispute.24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The availability of punitive damages in arbitration revolves around competing
policy goals. The policy goals in conflict include punishment and deterrence of
malicious behavior; promotion of settlement; enforcement of the intent of parties
who have reduced their agreement to writing; promotion of the enforceability of
arbitration agreements; and preservation of the right to punish by the state. The
manner in which these policy objectives are incorporated into the law are outlined
below. The New York approach to the availability of punitive damages in
arbitration is addressed first, followed by approaches in other jurisdictions.
17. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
18. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 120-21; see Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794.
19. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121.
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988) [hereinafter FAA].
21. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121.
22. Id. at 123.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 122.
19921
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A. The New York Approach
The availability of punitive damages in arbitration governed by New York
law is a complex and unsettled area of law.' As shall be seen, policy objectives
have driven the developing case law.
As a general proposition, New York substantive law provides that punitive
damages may be awarded in circumstances involving wanton and willful
conduct.26 However, when the dispute is being resolved outside of the court
system, the availability of punitive damages is curtailed.27 In Garrity, the New
York Court of Appeals held that punitive damages may not be awarded in
arbitration.28 Even where the parties had expressly provided for punitive
damages in their agreement, the court stated that the award of punitives is not
allowed in arbitration.29
The court offered a policy-based rationale to support its decision in denying
punitive damages in the arbitration setting. First, the court found that an award
of punitive damages in arbitration violates public policy.' The court stated that
public policy dictates that the award of punitive damages is reserved exclusively
to the state through the court system because punitive damage awards are very
similar in character to the imposition of criminal sanctions.3 The court
reasoned that because punitive damages are intended to punish, as are criminal
sanctions, the award of punitive damages should be left exclusively to the state
through the court system."
The court's second policy rationale is grounded in traditional notions of
contract law.33 The court found that a punitive damage award based on
arbitration arising out of a contract is improper because, historically, punitive
damages have not been awarded for a breach of contract.M4
The next major decision refining the availability of punitive damages in
arbitration under New York law was Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman.3" The
decision in Fahnestock both expanded and constricted the availability of punitive
25. Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration:
Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights
of Review, and Attorney's Fees and Costs, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1547, 1601 n.318 (1991).
26. Id. at 1599 (citing Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Trans. Corp., 878 F.2d 650, 657 (2d Cir.
1989); Smith v. Bolt Prod., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 371 (2d Cir. 1988); Borkowski v. Borkowski, 355
N.E.2d 287, 287 (N.Y. 1976)).




31. Id. at 794, 797.
32. Id. at 794, 796-97.
33. Id. at 795.
34. Id.
35. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991), and cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1241 (1992).
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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damages based on ambiguities left open in Garrity. These changes in the
availability of punitives, as explored in the Fahnestock decision, are addressed
below.
Fahnestock plugged a number of holes in the Garrity decision, which seemed
to allow punitive damages in limited circumstances in arbitration under New York
law. 36 First, Fahnestock rejected the contention that when arbitration falls under
the auspices of the FAA, federal substantive law preempts state law.37 Parties
seeking punitive damages argued that when an agreement falls within the FAA,
federal substantive rules (which allow punitives) apply and state rules do not. 8
Thus, if the Fahnestock court had accepted this argument, FAA preemption of
New York law would allow punitives in arbitration even where the parties'
agreement stated that New York law (which does not allow punitives) governed
the agreement.39 The Fahnestock court rejected this argument stating that the
policy behind the FAA was to create a body of federal substantive law to prevent
states from interfering with the enforceability of arbitration agreements.' The
court stated that the New York policy of disallowing punitives in arbitration does
not conflict with provisions of the FAA, thus federal substantive law does not
preempt state law. 4'
Fahnestock similarly closed the argument that federal substantive law applies
where no choice-of-law clause exists.42 Such an approach would allow an
arbiter to award punitive damages. 43 In rejecting this interpretation, the court
found that when federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the Erie
doctrine requires the law of the forum state to control." Thus, in a federal
court located in New York, the substantive law of New York provides the rule
of decision.45 As stated previously, New York law does not allow punitive
damages in arbitration.46
Finally, the Fahnestock court rejected the contention that a choice-of-law
clause intends to incorporate the New York arbitration law but not the New York
substantive law.47 The court stated that although the Garrity decision is
grounded in state policy concerns, it is no less a rule of state substantive law.48
36. Id. at 517-18.
37. Id. at 517.
38. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25
(1983)).
39. Id.
40, Id. (citing Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989)).
41. Id..
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Therefore, the court chose to apply the Garrity rule that punitive damages are not
available in arbitration governed by New York law.49
The Fahnestock decision limited the availability of punitive damages where
the Garrity decision was ambiguous. However, the Fahnestock court also
expanded the availability of punitives in certain situations. Fahnestock both
explicitly and implicitly presents situations where punitive damages are available
in arbitration under New York law. 0
The court first stated that punitive damages may be awarded in arbitration
under New York law where the arbitration claim is based on a RICO statute.
5 1
The court noted that, in such cases, jurisdiction is based on federal question.5 2
Thus, by basing the allowance of punitive damages on the federal question
jurisdiction, the court implied that other federal statutes which create federal
question jurisdiction and provide for punitive damages may also create situations
where punitive damages may be awarded in arbitration under New York law.53
Secondly, Fahnestock continued to open the door for the availability of
punitive damages by stating that punitive damages may be awarded when the
parties explicitly provide for such in their agreement.5 ' In so holding, the
Fahnestock court overruled that portion of the Garrity decision which held that
punitives are not available even when provided for in the parties' agreement. 5
The Fahnestock court reasoned that this portion of Garrity interfered with the
enforceability of arbitration agreements and was therefore in conflict with federal
substantive rules.5 6 Most importantly, the court implied that federal substantive
law can preempt New York state law on the issue of the availability of punitive
damages in arbitration, leaving open the possibility of total deterioration of the
Garrity rule. 7
Thirdly, the Fahnestock court noted two other related theories which allow
punitives in New York arbitration." The court noted that punitives may be
available when arbitration takes place in New York but only where the substantive
law of the state named in the parties' choice-of-law clause allows for punitives in
49. Id.
50. Id. at 518-19.
51. Id. at 519 (citing Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp. v. M/T Triumph, 924 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir.
1991)). In Kerr-McGee, the plaintiff, in arbitration, was awarded treble damages based on the RICO
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1884). Kerr-McGee, 924 F.2d at 470.
52. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519.
53. Id.; see also Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 25, at 1601-02 n.318.
54. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518; see Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794 (where the court found that
punitive damages are not available even if the parties had explicitly provided for them in their
agreement).
55. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 519.
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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arbitration. 9 Similarly, the court found that punitives may be awarded in
arbitration where the rules governing the arbitration allow them.'
In sum, the availability of punitive damages in arbitration under New York
law requires thorough analysis. It can be said with certainty that punitives are
available when the parties provide for them in their agreement, when based on a
RICO statute, or when the rules governing the arbitration allow for them.
Implicitly, punitives are also available when a statute creating federal-question
jurisdiction provides for them or where a party can show willful or wanton
conduct. However, outside of the situations outlined above, punitive damages are
unavailable in arbitration under New York law.
B. Approaches in Other Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions outside of New York present a wide spectrum of approaches in
addressing the availability of punitive damages in arbitration. Some jurisdictions
allow arbiters complete freedom to award punitives, while other jurisdictions do
not allow punitives in any situation. The policies which drive the yarious
approaches are discussed below.
Those jurisdictions which do not allow punitive damages in arbitration reason
that the award of punitives in arbitration violates public policy.6 Some of these
courts follow the Garrity rationale that the award of punitives is preserved to the
state through the court system.62 In United States Fidelity & Guaranty v.
Defluiter,63 the Indiana Court of Appeals offered a slightly different public
policy rationale, stating that parties cannot contract to gain a benefit or suffer a
loss from the issuance of punitive damages.' At this time, eight jurisdictions
prohibit the award of punitive damages in arbitration.'
In the federal system, an arbiter's award of punitive damages is generally
allowed. 6 The most thorough and well-reasoned federal opinion in support of
allowing punitives to be granted by arbiters comes from the Eleventh Circuit in
59. Id.
60. Id. Commentators have noted that punitive damages may be available in arbitration under
New York law where a party can prove fraud or some other type of wanton or willful conduct which
is associated with the arbitration agreement. See Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 25, at 1601
n.318.
61. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 698 P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985).
62. Margaret P. Sullivan, Comment, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 TUL. L. REV.
1113, 1133 (1988); see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
63. 456 N.E.2d 429.
64. Id. at 432; see also Sullivan, supra note 62, at 1133.
65. Sullivan, supra note 62, at 1128 (citing JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, 1 PUNITIVE
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.01 (1985 & Supp. 1987)). The jurisdictions which do not allow
punitive damages in arbitration include Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, and Washington. Id.
66. Id. at 1133.
19921
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the case of Willoughby Roofing & Supply v. Kajima International, Inc.67
Willoughby stands for two propositions: (1) arbiters should be granted broad
powers in fashioning remedies including the power to award punitive damages;68
and (2) federal arbitration law controls the issue of whether punitives may be
granted by an arbiter. 69 The rationale enunciated in Willoughby is representative
of the rationale presented by other federal courts. Therefore, the federal court
system policy rationales supporting the Willoughby propositions are addressed in
the context of this touchstone case. 70
In Willoughby, the court first held that arbiters should be granted broad
power and flexibility in crafting remedies to resolve disputes. 71 In support of
this position, the court stated that federal policy promotes liberal construction of
arbitration agreements.' 2  Further, the court buttressed its position by
recognizing that ambiguities in the parties' agreement are resolved in favor of
allowing the arbiter to decide the issue.73 Thus, based on policy concerns, the
court concluded that to foster the federal policy of promotion of settlement,
arbiters must be granted broad powers and flexibility in crafting remedies.74
The court concluded that such power and flexibility must include the power to
award punitive damages; otherwise settlement is inhibited because the arbiter is
restricted in fashioning a remedy.
75
Secondly, the Willoughby decision examined the proposition that federal
arbitration law, rather than state law, controls the issue of whether an arbiter may
award punitive damages. 76 This prong of the opinion illustrates the New York
approach.' The Willoughby court found that federal arbitration law controls the
categories of claims which may be arbitrated and that punitive damages are
67. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aft'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 357-58.
69. Id. at 360.
70. See generally id. at 357-64. The arbitration clause in question in the Willoughby case
provided:
All claims, disputes, and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this
Agreement . . . or the breach thereof. . . shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This agreement to arbitrate shall be
specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law...
Id. at 355.
71. Id. at 357.
72. Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
585 (1960)).
73. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (1983); Lackawanna Leather Co.
v. United Foods & Commercial Workers, 706 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983); Daniel Constr. Co. v.
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 513, 570 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 738
F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1984)).
74. Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 360.
77. See id. at 359; see also supra notes 25-60 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
8
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss2/5
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ARBITRATION
included in the category which can be arbitrated.7 8 Thus, the court held that
even where a choice-of-law clause provides that a certain state's law should
control the agreement, federal arbitration law instead controls and allows the
punitive damages issue to be included in the arbitration.7 9 Therefore, even if
the substantive law of the state preferred by a choice-of-law clause does not allow
for punitive damages, federal arbitration law will override the state law and allow
punitive damages.'
The Willoughby court addressed additional rationales advanced by federal
courts which support the availability of punitive damages in arbitration. The
court noted that in disallowing punitive damages in arbitration, parties are in
effect waiving their right to such an award.8" The court stated that such an
approach undermines the value of arbitration in resolving disputes82 and further
runs afoul of the purpose of punitive damages, which is to foster the policy goal
of deterrence and punishment of malicious behavior.8 3
Finally, the court noted that cutting off a party's ability to pursue punitive
damages in. arbitration is inefficient.A4 The court offered the example where
both a contract and tort claim arise out of the parties' agreement. 5  In such a
situation, the contract claim is submitted and fully decided by arbitration. 6
However, a tort claim which includes a punitive damages issue must be decided
by a court.8 7 The court found that the necessity of utilizing two different forums
to resolve one dispute based on essentially the same facts was wasteful.8 8 The
court stated that this result undermines the main utility of arbitration - the
reduction of congestion in the court system and quick and inexpensive resolution
of all disputes.8 9  Thus, the court stated that another solution is to allow
punitives in arbitration where the parties have agreed to arbitrate.9'
78. Id. at 359-60 (citing Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967); Ultracashmere House Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 1981); Tullis v.
Kohlmeyer, 551 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1977); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp.
821, 823-24 (M.D.N.C. 1983)).
79. Id. at 359-60.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 363 (citing Baselki v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D.
Il1. 1981)).
82. Id.
83. Sullivan, supra note 62, at 1128 (citing GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 65, §§ 4.13-16).
84. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363.
85. Id. at 363-64 (citing Richard P. Hackett, Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search
for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 299 (1978)).
86. Id. at 364; Hackett, supra note 85, at 299.
87. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp at 363-64.
88. Id. at 363-64; Hackett, supra note 85, at 299.
89. Id. at 364 (citing Ultracashmere House Ltd., 664 F.2d at 1179); see also Kupperman &
Freeman, supra note 25, at 1597.
90. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 365.
19921
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Barbier court first analyzed the district court's confirmation of the
arbiter's award of compensatory damages, 91 then addressed the punitive damages
award. 9 The court held that an arbiter may not award punitive damages where
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and where the parties themselves
have agreed that the law of the state of New York shall govern any disputes
between them.' The punitive damages portion of the arbitration award was
reversed by the appellate court. 94
In analyzing the legitimacy of the district court's confirmation of the arbitral
award of punitive damages, the appellate court faced the key issue of whether to
apply the Garrity rule.9 In determining whether to apply the Garrity rule, the
court relied on the Fahnestock holding.' In Fahnestock, the parties' arbitration
clause was silent as to the arbiter's ability to award punitive damages.' The
court in that case stated that where the parties do not address the punitive
damages issue, state law, rather than federal substantive law is to be followed in
determination of the case.98
In the instant decision, the court found that the Garrity rule applied because
the parties expressly agreed that the law of the state of New York would govern
any dispute under the contract.' Plaintiffs contended that federal substantive
law should apply because of the policy goals underlying the adoption of the
FAA, ° which provides that federal substantive law should apply where state
law inhibits the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.' 0 ' In rejecting the
Plaintiffs' argument, the court reasoned that the FAA preempts state law only
where state law is in direct conflict with the FAA."° The court found that no
such conflict existed and that the Garrity rule should apply, therefore vacating the
arbitral award of punitive damages. 0 3
91. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 120. The focus of this Casenote is on the appellate court's treatment
of the district court's confirmation of the award of punitive damages. The appellate court's decision
is not significant in regard to the compensatory portion of the award. Therefore, the appellate court's
reasoning in affirmation of the compensatory portion of the award does not merit attention for the
purposes of this Casenote.
92. Id. at 121.
93. Id. at 122.
94. Id. at 123.
95. Id. at 121; see Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794.
96. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122.
97. Id. at 121.
98. Id. at 121-122.
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The court next addressed the Plaintiffs' contention that the choice-of-law
clause in the parties' agreement applied only to state substantive law and not to
arbitration law."° In rejecting this construction, the court reasoned that damage
measures are issues of state law. 05 The court further stated that the fact that
damage measures are based on state policy concerns did not make it any less a
rule of substantive law." Thus, the court found that because the choice-of-law
clause goes to state substantive law, the Garrity rule applied and the district
court's confirmation of the arbiter's award of punitive damages must be
vacated. 107
Finally, the court recognized that arbitration awards can only be vacated in
select circumstances, such as when arbiters exceed their powers." The court
reasoned that because New York law does not allow an arbiter to award punitive
damages, the arbiters here exceeded their power. 10 Thus, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the portion of the judgment awarding the Plaintiffs
punitive damages,"' and the remainder of the award was affirmed."' The
court then directed the district court to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs in the
amount of $104,516 plus interest." 2
V. COMMENT
The Barbier decision is important because it solidifies the law in regard to
an arbiter's ability to award punitive damages where the parties' agreement is to
resolve all disputes between them in accordance with the law of the state of New
York. However, the New York approach frustrates the federal court system's
policy goal of promoting settlement to avoid litigation. The shortcomings of the
New York approach discourage arbitration and unfairly require parties to become
intimately aware of the law of the state of New York to avoid the traps associated
in choosing New York law to govern any dispute. The deficiencies of the New
York approach as well as an alternative approach are discussed below.
The federal court system maintains a strong policy in favor of promoting
settlement to avoid litigation. "' However, the approach that the federal courts
in New York adopt, as illustrated in Barbier, conflicts with this goal. " The
New York approach frustrates settlement because it limits the parties' ability to
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518).
106. Id. (citing Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518).
107. Id. at 123.
108. Id. at 122; see Carte Blanche, 888 F.2d at 264.
109. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122.
110. Id. at 123.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
114. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 364; see also Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 25, at 1597.
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resolve all disputes in arbitration." 5 For example, assume that a party brings
both a contract and a tort action involving potential punitive damages arising
under the parties' agreement."6 The contract claim may be arbitrated, whereas
a tort claim involving punitive damages must be resolved by the court system." 7
This result does not foster the policy goal of reducing congestion in the court
system... and does not allow arbitration to provide finality to disputes between
the parties." 9  Thus, the Barbier case discourages arbitration and fails to
promote settlement to reduce litigation.
The New York approach also unfairly requires that the parties become
intimately aware of the ramifications of incorporating New York law into their
agreement. In Barbier, as in similar cases involving brokerage agreements, the
brokerage firm provides the contract detailing the parties' relationship. 20 This
contract will often contain a choice-of-law clause and a boilerplate arbitration
clause. "2' Often, these contracts are entered into by the brokerage firm's
clients who are unaware of the consequences in choosing New York law to
govern the agreement. 1' Thus, a client may unknowingly relinquish his or her
claim for punitive damages or at least may be barred from pursuing such claim
in arbitration.'23
Where the parties believe that all of the disputes that arise between them will
be resolved through arbitration, it frustrates the intent of the parties to disallow
resolution of a punitive damages issue, especially when factored with the difficulty
in understanding unsettled New York law. 24 Additionally, the result in Barbier
is unfair because it is in conflict with traditional notions of waiver 125 and the
contract doctrine of construing agreements against the drafter.126 For the many
reasons outlined above, the result in Barbier is unfair and discourages arbitration
because it requires an intimate knowledge of the ramifications of incorporating the
law of the state of New York into an agreement.
The better approach is to grant arbiters the flexibility to award punitive
damages when parties have included a broad arbitration clause stating that all
115. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 364; see also Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 25, at 1597.
116. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363.
117. Id. at 364.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953, 1007-08 (1986).
121. See id. at 1008.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 364-65.
124. Stipanowich, supra note 120, at 1008-09; see also Thomas J. Kenny, Comment, Punitive
Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Unresolved Question of Pendent State Claims, 37 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1113, 1140-41 (1988).
125. Stipanowich, supra note 120, at 1008 (citing Cornelia G. Farmer, Comment, Commercial
Arbitration Agreements: Let the Signer Beware, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 466, 479 n.74 (1978)).
126. Id. at 1009 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1982); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 678-79 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1968)).
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disputes between the parties arising out of a certain contract will be resolved in
arbitration. An arbiter's power to award punitive damages should only be
restricted when the parties explicitly provide in their agreement that the arbiter
may not award such damages. This approach fosters a number of policy goals;
specifically, it promotes settlement and deters malicious and outrageous conduct.
This approach also eliminates claim-preclusion problems, issue preclusion
problems, and preemption problems involved in the conflicts between state law
and the FAA. Finally, uniform adoption of this approach would create stability
in this area of law because the uncertainty involved in choosing the law of the
state of New York would be eliminated. Thus, the parties would be aware of the
ramifications of the agreement when they entered into it.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, allowing an arbiter the flexibility to award
punitive damages fosters the policy goal of promoting settlement. 12 7 Under the
law of the state of New York, parties who seek punitive damages are often forced
to utilize arbitration for a portion of their claims and then move to the court
system to pursue punitive damages.'28 Thus, the incentive for including an
arbitration clause in the agreement, i.e., fast and non-judicial resolution of a
dispute, is removed.' 29
The strongest argument in opposition to allowing arbiters to award punitive
damages in all cases rests on the notion that punitive damages are granted to
punish, a function preserved to the state through the court system.'o However,
arbiters' awards are routinely approved by the court before the award becomes
final and binding on the opposing party. 3' Thus, the court system will have the
opportunity to evaluate the reasonableness of any arbitral award of punitive
damages.' 32 Therefore, the approach which allows an arbiter to award punitive
damages in all cases, unless explicitly precluded in the parties' agreement, should
be adopted.
Allowing an arbiter to award punitive damages also promotes the policy goal
of punishing and deterring wrongful behavior."' Under New York law, a party
127. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363-64 (citing Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin., Ltd., 667 F.2d 160,
164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also Ultracashmere House Ltd., 664 F.2d at 1179.
128. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 364.
129. Id. (citing Davis, 667 F.2d at 164-65; Ultracashmere House Ld., 664 F.2d at 1179).
130. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796-97.
131. See Barbier, 948 F.2d at 120.
132. Section 10 of the Arbitration Act states that an arbiter's award may be vacated if (a) the
award is a product of fraud; (b) there is evidence that the arbiter is biased; (c) the arbiter was guilty
of misconduct which prejudiced one of the parties; or (d) the arbiter exceeded their powers.
Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 25, at 1609. Courts have also found that an arbiter's award may
be vacated if the arbiter has manifestly disregarded the law, the award is arbitrary or capricious, or
enforcement of the award would violate public policy. Id. The author of this Casenote notes that
often presentation of an arbitration award is not broken down into amounts for punitive and other
types of damages. To provide the parties and the court with the ability to determine the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award, the amount allocated for punitive damages should be
listed separately.
133. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 65, §§ 2.01-09.
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may breach an agreement and expect to pay the same amount in damages in
arbitration regardless of the maliciousness of the breach. This immunity from
punitive damages will encourage intentional wrongdoing." Further, the party
seeking punitive damages will have to bring an action in the court system which
may deter a party from pursuing the claim.135 Granting an arbiter the power
to award punitive damages will remedy this problem because breaching parties
who are aware that they are subject to punitive damages may be less likely to
indulge in outrageous and malicious behavior. Because of its deterrent effect, an
approach which allows arbiters to award punitive damages should be adopted in
place of the current New York approach.
Adoption of an approach which would allow arbiters to award punitive
damages would also eliminate litigation surrounding conflicts of state law
preemption of the FAA. In Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 13 6
the court reiterated the doctrine that parties should be able to arbitrate in any
manner that they wish.'37 Thus, courts are faced with determining what the
parties intended by incorporating a choice-of-law clause in their agreement.1 38
The possibilities include: (1) the parties intended to incorporate state law and fully
displace the FAA;1 39 (2) the parties intended to adopt state substantive law only,
whereby federal law would control procedure, validity and enforceability
issues;" or (3) the parties intended to adopt state procedural rules but intended
that federal substantive law should apply. 1 ' Given the myriad of possibilities,
a court would be able to use a choice-of-law clause to achieve any result it
believes is practical. 4 2  This situation creates uncertainty for the parties.
1 4 3
Uniform adoption of an approach which would provide arbiters with the power
to award punitive damages would remove this uncertainty and would encourage
parties to enter agreements to arbitrate because they would know the effect of the
agreement before they enter into it. Encouraging parties to enter arbitration
agreements fosters the federal policy of promoting settlement to discourage
litigation.
134. Kenny, supra note 124, at 1140.
135. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 364.
136. 489 U.S. 468.
137. See Arthur S. Feldman, Note, Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University: Confusing Federalism With Policy Under the FAA, 69 TEX. L. REV. 691,
710 (1991).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 712.
140. Id. at 716.
141. Id. at 719.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Promotion of settlement to reduce litigation is a well-established policy goal
of our federal court system. Flexibility in fashioning remedies in alternative
dispute resolution advances this policy goal. An approach which would allow
punitive damages to be awarded in all cases (except where the parties expressly
provide to the contrary) promotes settlement of disputes. Further, because such
an approach does not require an in-depth understanding of state substantive law,
it is fair to all parties. Such an approach would avoid problems of parties
unwittingly waiving a claim to punitive damages or forcing a party to pursue the
claim in arbitration as well as in the court system. Thus, adoption of a uniform
rule which allows an arbiter to award punitive damages unless expressly precluded
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